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LARRY LAUD AN 
THE DEMISE OF THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We live in a society which sets great store by science. Scientific 'experts' play 
a privileged role in many of our institutions, ranging from the courts of law 
to the corridors of power. At a more fundamental level, most of us strive to 
shape our beliefs about the natural world in the 'scientific' image. If scientists 
say that continents move or that the universe is billions of years old, we 
generally believe them, however counter-intuitive and implausible their claims 
might appear to be. Equally, we tend to acquiesce in what scientists tell us 
not to believe. If, for instance, scientists say that Velikovsky was a crank, 
that the biblical creation story is hokum, that UFOs do not exist, or that 
acupuncture is ineffective, then we generally make the scientist's contempt 
for these things our own, reserving for them those social sanctions and dis-
approbations which are the just deserts of quacks, charlatans and con-men. 
In sum, much of our intellectual life, and increasingly large portions of our 
social and political life, rest on the assumption that we (or, if not we our-
selves, then someone whom we trust in these matters) can tell the difference 
between science and its counterfeit. 
For a variety of historical and logical reasons, some going back more than 
two millennia, that to whom we turn to find out the difference 
usually happens to be the philosopher. Indeed, it would not be going too far 
to say that, for a very long time, philosophers have been regarded as the 
gatekeepers to the scientific estate. They are the ones who are supposed to 
be able to tell the difference between real science and pseudo-science. In 
the familiar academic scheme of things, it is specifically the theorists of 
knowledge and the philosophers of science who are charged with arbitrating 
and legitimating the claims of any sect to 'scientific' status. It is small wonder, 
under the circumstances, that the question of the nature of science has 
loomed so large in Western philosophy. From Plato to Popper, philosophers 
have sought to identify those epistemic features which mark off science from 
other sorts of belief and activity. 
Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that philosophy has largely failed to 
deliver the relevant goods. Whatever the specific strengths and deficiencies of 
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the numerous well-known efforts at demarcation (several of which will be 
discussed below), it is probably fair to say that there is no demarcation line 
between science and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, 
which would win assent from a majority of philosophers. Nor is there one 
which should win acceptance from philosophers or anyone else; but more of 
that below. 
What lessons are we to draw from the recurrent failure of philosophy to 
detect the epistemic traits which mark science off from other systems of 
belief? That failure might conceivably be due simply to our impoverished 
philosophical imagination; it is conceivable, after all, that science really is 
sui generis, and that we philosophers have just not yet hit on its characteristic 
features. Alternatively, it may just be that there are no epistemic features 
which all and only the diSCiplines we accept as 'scientific' share in common. 
My aim in this paper is to make a brief excursion into the history of the 
science/non-science demarcation in order to see what light it might shed on 
the contemporary viability of the quest for a demarcation device. 
2. THE OLD DEMARCATIONIST TRADITION 
As far back as the time of Parmenides, Western philosophers thOUght it 
important to distinguish knowledge (episteme) from mere opinion (doxa), 
reality from appearance, truth from error. By the time of Aristotle, these 
epistemic concerns came to be focussed on the question of the nature of 
scientific knowledge. In his highly influential Posterior Analytics, Aristotle 
described at length what was involved in having scientific knowledge of 
something. To be scientific, he said, one must deal with causes, one must 
use logical demonstrations, and one must identify the universals which 
'inhere' in the particulars of sense. But above all, to have science one must 
have apodictic certainty. It is this last feature which, for Aristotle, most 
clearly distinguished the scientific way of knowing. What separates the 
sciences from other kinds of beliefs is the irtfallibility of their foundations 
and, thanks to that infallibility, the incorrigibility of their constituent theo-
ries. The first principles of nature are directly intuited from sense; everything 
else worthy of the name of science follows demonstrably from these first 
principles. What characterizes the whole enterprise is a degree of certainty 
which distinguishes it most crucially from mere opinion. 
But Aristotle sometimes offered a second demarcation criterion, ortho-
gonal to this one between science and opinion. Specifically, he distinguished 
between know-how (the sort of knowledge which the craftsman and the 
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engineer possess) and what we might call 'know-why' or demonstrative under-
standing (which the scientist alone possesses). A shipbuilder, for instance, 
knows how to form pieces of wood together so as to make a seaworthy vessel; 
but he does not have, and has no need for, a syllogistic, causal demonstration 
based on the primary principles or first causes of things. Thus, he needs to 
know that wood, when properly sealed, floats; but he need not be able to 
show by virtue of what principles and causes wood has this property of 
buoyancy. By contrast, the scientist is concerned with what Aristotle calls 
the "reasoned fact"; until he can show why a thing behaves as its does by 
tracing its causes back to first principles, he has no scientific knowledge of 
the thing. 
Coming out of Aristotle's work, then, is a pair of demarcation criteria. 
Science is distinguished from opinion and superstition by the certainty of 
its principles; it is marked off from the crafts by its comprehension of first 
causes. This set of contrasts comes to dominate discussions of the nature 
of science throughout the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and thus 
to proVide a crucial backdrop to the re-examination of these issues in the 
seventeenth century. 
It is instructive to see how this approach worked in practice. One of 
the most revealing examples is provided by pre-modern astronomy. By the 
time of Ptolemy, mathematical astronomers had largely abandoned the 
(Aristotelian) tradition of seeking to derive an account of planetary motion 
from the causes or essences of the planetary material. As Duhem and others 
have shown in great detail ,1 many astronomers sought simply to correlate 
planetary motions, independently of any causal assumptions about the 
essence or first principles of the heavens. Straightaway, this turned them 
from scientists into craftsmen.2 To make matters worse, astronomers used a 
technique of post hoc testing of their theories. Rather than deriving their 
models from directly-intuited first principles, they offered hypothetical 
constructions of planetary motions and positions and then compared the 
predictions drawn from their models with the observed positions of the 
heavenly bodies. This mode of theory testing is, of course, highly fallible and 
non-demonstrative; and it was known at the time to be so. The central point 
for our purposes is that, by abandoning a demonstrative method based on 
necessary first principles, the astronomers were indulging in mere opinion 
rather than knowledge, putting themselves well beyond the scientific pale. 
Through virtually the whole of the Middle and indeed up until the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, the predominant view of mathematical 
astronomy was that, for the reasons indicated, it did not qualify as a 'science'. 
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(It is worth noting in passing that much of the furor caused by the astro-
nomical work of Copernicus and Kepler was a result of the fact that they 
were claiming to make astronomy 'scientific' again.) 
More generally, the seventeenth century brought a very deep shift in 
demarcationist sensibilities. To make a long and fascinating story unconscion-
ably brief, we can say that most seventeenth century thinkers accepted 
Aristotle's first demarcation criterion (viz., between infallible science and 
fallible opinion), but rejected his second (between know-how and understand-
ing). For instance, if we look to the work of Galileo, Huygens or Newton, 
we see a refusal to prefer know-why to know-how; indeed, all three were 
prepared to regard as entirely scientific, systems of belief which laid no claim 
to an understanding grounded in primary causes or essences. Thus Galileo 
claimed to know little or nothing about the underlying causes responsible 
for the free fall of bodies, and in his own science of kinematics he steadfastly 
refused to speculate about such matters. But Galileo believed that he could 
still sustain his claim to be developing a 'science of motion' because the 
results he reached were, so he claimed, infallible and demonstrative. Similarly, 
Newton in Principia was not indifferent to causal explanation, and freely 
admitted that he would like to know the causes of gravitational phenomena; 
but he was emphatic that, even without a knowledge of the causes of gravity, 
one can engage in a sophisticated and scientific account of the gravitational 
behavior of the heavenly bodies. As with Galileo, Newton regarded his 
non-causal account as 'scientifical' because of the (avowed) certainty of its 
conclusions. As Newton told his readers over and again, he did not engage 
in hypotheses and speculations: he purported to be deriving his theories 
directly from the phenomena. Here again, the infallibility of results, rather 
than their derivability from first causes, comes to be the single touchstone 
of scientific status. 
Despite the divergence of approach among thinkers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, there is widespread agreement that scientific knowledge 
is apodictically certain. And this consensus cuts across most of the usual 
epistemological divides of the period. For instance, Bacon, Locke, Leibniz, 
Descartes, Newton and Kant are in accord about this way of characterizing 
science.3 They may disagree about how precisely to certify the certainty 
of knowledge, but none quarrels with the claim that science and infallible 
knowledge are co-terminous. 
As I have shown elsewhere,4 this influential account fmally and decisively 
came unraveled in the nineteenth century with the emergence and eventual 
triumph of a fallibilistic perspective in epistemology. Once one accepts, as 
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most thinkers had by the mid-nineteenth century, that science offers no 
apodictic certainty, that all scientific theories are corrigible and may be 
subject to serious emendation, then it is no longer viable to attempt to 
distinguish science from non-science by assimilating that distinction to 
the difference between knowledge and opinion. Indeed, the unambiguous 
implication of fallibilism is that there is no difference between knowledge and 
opinion: within a fallibilist framework, scientific belief turns out to be just 
a species of the genus opinion. Several nineteenth century philosophers of 
science tried to take some of the sting out of this volte-face by suggesting that 
scientific opinions were more probable or more reliable than non-scientific 
ones; but even they conceded that it was no longer possible to make infalli-
bility the hallmark of scientific knowledge. 
With certainty no longer available as the demarcation tool, nineteenth 
century philosophers and scientists quickly forged other tools to do the job. 
Thinkers as diverse as Comte, Bain, Jevons, Helmholtz and Mach (to name 
only a few) began to insist that what really marks science off from everything 
else is its methodology. There was, they maintained, something called 'the 
scientific method'; even if that method was not fool-proof (the acceptance 
of fallibilism demanded that concession), it was at least a better technique for 
testing empirical claims than any other. And if it did make mistakes, it was 
sufficiently self-corrective that it would soon discover them and put them 
right. As one writer remarked a few years later: "if science lead us astray, 
more science will set us straight".5 One need hardly add that the nineteenth 
century did not invent the idea of a logic of scientific inquiry; that dates 
back at least to Aristotle. But the new insistence in this period is on a fallible 
method which, for all its fallibility, is nonetheless superior to its non-scientific 
rivals. 
This effort to mark science off from other things required one to show 
two things. First, that the various activities regarded as science utilized essen-
tially the same repertoire of methods (hence the importance in the period 
of the so-called thesis of the 'unity of method'); secondly, the epistemic 
credentials of this method had to be established. At first blush, this pro-
gram of identifying science with a certain technique of inquiry is not a 
silly one; indeed, it still persists in some respectable circles even in our 
time. But the nineteenth century could not begin to deliver on the two 
requirements just mentioned because there was no agreement about what the 
scientific method was. Some took it to be the canons of inductive reasoning 
sketched out by Herschel and Mill. Others insisted that the basic methodolog-
ical principle of science was that its theories must be restricted to observable 
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entities (the nineteenth century requirement of 'vera causa').6 Still others, 
like Whewell and Peirce, rejected the search for verae causae altogether and 
argued that the only decisive methodological test of a theory involved its 
ability successfully to make surprising predictions.' Absent agreement on 
what 'the scientific method' amounted to, demarcationists were scarcely 
in a position to argue persuasively that what individuated science was its 
method. 
This approach was further embarrassed by a notorious set of ambiguities 
surrounding several of its key components. Specifically, many of the meth-
odological rules proposed were much too ambiguous for one to tell when 
they were being followed and when breached. Thus, such common methodo-
logical rules as "avoid ad hoc hypotheses", "postulate simple theories", 
"feign no hypotheses", and "eschew theoretical entities" involved complex 
conceptions which neither scientists nor philosophers of the period were 
willing to explicate. To exacerbate matters still further, what most philoso-
phers of science of the period offered up as an account of 'the scientific 
method' bore little resemblance to the methods actually used by working 
scientists, a point made with devastating clarity by Pierre Duhem in 1908.8 
As one can see, the situation by the late nineteenth century was more 
than a little ironic. At precisely that juncture when science was beginning 
to have a decisive impact on the lives and institutions of Western man, at 
precisely that time when 'scientism' (Le., the belief that science and science 
alone has the answers to all our answerable questions) was gaining ground, in 
exactly that quarter century when scientists were doing battle in earnest with 
all manner of 'pseudo-scientists' (e.g., homeopathic physicians, spiritualists, 
phrenologists, biblical geologists), scientists and philosophers found them-
selves empty-handed. Except at the rhetorical level, there was no longer any 
consensus about what separated science from anything else. 
Surprisingly (or, if one is cynically inclined, quite expectedly), the absence 
of a plausible demarcation criterion did not stop fin de siecle scientists and 
philosophers from haranguing against what they regarded as pseudo-scientific 
nonsense (any more than their present-day counterparts are hampered by a 
similar lack of consensus); but it did make their protestations less compelling 
than their confident denunciations of 'quackery' might otherwise suggest. It 
is true, of course, that there was still much talk about 'the scientific method'; 
and doubtless many hoped that the methods of science could play the demar-
cationist role formerly assigned to certainty. But, leaving aside the fact that 
agreement was lacking about precisely what the scientific method was, there 
was no good reason as yet to prefer anyone of the proposed 'scientific 
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methods' to any purportedly 'non-scientific' ones, since no one had managed 
to show either that any of the candidate 'scientific methods' qualified them 
as 'knowledge' (in the traditional sense of the term) or, even more minimally, 
that those methods were epistemically superior to their rivals. 
3. A METAPHlLOSOPHICAL INTERLUDE 
Before we move to consider and to assess some familiar demarcationist 
proposals from our own epoch, we need to engage briefly in certain meta-
philosophical preliminaries. Specifically, we should ask three central ques-
tions: (1) What conditions of adequacy should a proposed demarcation 
criterion satisfy? (2) Is the criterion under consideration offering necessary 
or sufficient conditions, or both, for scientific status? (3) What actions 
or judgments are implied by the claim that a certain belief or activity is 
'scientific' or 'unscientific'? 
(1) Early in the history of thought it was inevitable that characterizations 
of 'science' and 'knowledge' would be largely stipulative and a priori. After all, 
until as late as the seventeenth century, there were few developed examples 
of empirical sciences which one could point to or whose properties one could 
study; under such circumstances, where one is working largely ab initio, 
one can be uncompromisingly legislative about how' a term like 'science' 
or 'knowledge' will be used. But as the sciences developed and prospered, 
philosophers began to see the task of formulating a demarcation criterion 
as no longer a purely stipulative undertaking. Any proposed dividing line 
between science and non-science would have to be (at least in part) explicative 
and thus sensitive to existing patterns of usage. Accordingly, if one were 
today to offer a defmition of 'science' which classified (say) the major 
theories of physics and chemistry as non-scientific, one would thereby have 
failed to reconstruct some paradigmatic cases of the use of the term. Where 
Plato or Aristotle need not have worried if some or even most of the intellec-
tual activities of their time failed to satisfy their respective definitions of 
'science', it is inconceivable that we would fmd a demarcation criterion 
satisfactory which relegated to unscientific status a large number of the 
activities we consider scientific or which admitted as sciences activities which 
seem to us decidedly unscientific. In other words, the quest for a latter-day 
demarcation criterion involves an attempt to render explicit those shared 
but largely implicit sorting mechanisms whereby most of us can agree about 
paradigmatic cases of the scientific and the non-scientific. (And it seems to 
me that there is a large measure of agreement at this paradigmatic level, even 
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allowing for the existence of plenty of controversial problem cases.) A failure 
to do justice to these implicit sortings would be a grave drawback for any 
demarcation criterion. 
But we expect more than this of a philosophically significant demarcation 
criterion between science and non-science. Minimally, we expect a demarca-
tion criterion to identify the epistemic or methodological features which 
mark off scientific beliefs from unscientific ones. We want to know what, if 
anything, is special about the knowledge claims and the modes of inquiry of 
the sciences. Because there are doubtless many respects in which science 
differs from non-science (e.g., scientists may make larger salaries, or know 
more mathematics than non-scientists), we must insist that any philosophi-
cally interesting demarcative device must distinguish scientific and non-scien-
tific matters in a way which exhibits a surer epistemic warrant or evidential 
ground for science than for non-science. If it should happen that there is no 
such warrant, then the demarcation between science and non-science would 
tum out to be of little or no philosophic significance. 
Minimally, then, a philosophical demarcation criterion must be an adequate 
explication of our ordinary ways of partitioning science from non-science 
and it must exhibit epistemically significant differences between science and 
non-science. Additionally, as we have noted before, the criterion must have 
sufficient precision that we can tell whether various activities and beliefs 
whose status we are investigating do or do not satisfy it; otherwise it is no 
better than no criterion at all. 
(2) What will the formal structure of a demarcation criterion have to 
look like if it is to accomplish the tasks for which it is designed? Ideally, 
it would specify a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient con-
ditions for deciding whether an activity or set of statements is scientific 
or unscientific. As is well known, it has not proved easy to produce a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for science. Would something less 
ambitious do the job? It seems unlikely. Suppose, for instance, that some-
one offers us a characterization which purports to be a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for scientific status. Such a condition, if acceptable, 
would allow us to identify certain activities as decidedly unscientific, but it 
would not help 'fix our beliefs', because it would not specify which systems 
actually were scientific. We would have to say things like: "Well, physics 
might be a science (assuming it fulfills the stated necessary conditions), but 
then again it might not, since necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
application of a term do not warrant application of the term." If, like Popper, 
we want to be able to answer the question, "when should a theory be ranked 
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as scientific?",9 then merely necessary conditions will never permit us to 
answer it. 
For different reasons, merely sufficient conditions are equally inadequate. 
If we are only told: "satisfy these conditions and you will be scientific", 
we are left with no machinery for determining that a certain activity or 
statement is unscientific. The fact that (say) astrology failed to satisfy a set 
of merely sufficient conditions for scientific status would leave it in a kind 
of epistemic, twilight zone - possibly scientific, possibly not. Here again, 
we cannot construct the relevant partitioning. Hence, if (in the spirit of 
Popper) we "wish to distinguish between science and pseudo-science", 10 
sufficient conditions are inadequate. The importance of these seemingly 
abstract matters can be brought home by considering some real-life examples. 
Recent legislation in several American states mandates the teaching of 'crea-
tion science' alongside evolutionary theory in high school science classes. 
Opponents of this legislation have argued that evolutionary theory is authentic 
science, while creation science is not science at all. Such a judgment, and 
we are apt to make parallel ones all the time, would not be warranted by 
any demarcation criterion which gave only necessary or only sufficient 
conditions for scientific status. Without conditions which are both necessary 
and sufficient, we are never in a position to say "this is scientific: but that is 
unscientific". A demarcation criterion which fails to provide both sorts of 
conditions simply will not perform the tasks expected of it. 
(3) Closely related to this point is a broader question of the purposes 
behind the formulation of a demarcation criterion. No one can look at 
the history of debates between scientists and 'pseudo-scientists' without 
realizing that demarcation criteria are typically used as machines de guerre in 
a polemical battle between rival camps. Indeed, many of those most closely 
associated with the demarcation issue have evidently had hidden (and some-
times not so hidden) agendas of various sorts. It is well known, for instance, 
that Aristotle was concerned to embarrass the practitioners of Hippocratic 
medicine; and it is notorious that the logical positivists wanted to repudiate 
metaphysics and that Popper was out to 'get' Marx and Freud. In every case, 
they used a demarcation criterion of their own devising as the discrediting 
device. 
Precisely because a demarcation criterion will typically assert the epistemic 
superiority of science over non-science, the formulation of such a criterion 
will result in the sorting of beliefs into such categories as 'sound' and 'un-
sound', 'respectable' and 'cranky', or 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable'. Philoso-
phers should not shirk from the formulation of a demarcation criterion 
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merely because it has these judgmental implications associated with it. Quite 
the reverse, philosophy at its best should tell us what is reasonable to believe 
and what is not. But the value-loaded character of the term 'science' (and 
its cognates) in our culture should make us realize that the labelling of a 
certain activity as 'scientific' or 'unscientific' has social and political ramifica-
tions which go well beyond the taxonomic task of sorting beliefs into two 
piles. Although the cleaver that makes the cut may be largely epistemic in 
character, it has consequences which are decidedly non-epistemic. Precisely 
because a demarcation criterion will serve as a rationale for taking a number 
of practical actions which may well have far-reaching moral, social and 
economic consequences, it would be wise to insist that the arguments in 
favor of any demarcation criterion we intend to take seriously should be 
especially compelling. 
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can turn to an examination of 
the recent history of demarcation. 
4. THE NEW DEMARCATIONIST TRADITION 
As we have seen, there was ample reason by 1900 to conclude that neither 
certainty nor generation according to a privileged set of methodolOgical rules 
was adequate to denominate science. It should thus come as no surprise that 
philosophers of the 1920's and 1930's added a couple of new wrinkles to the 
problem. As is well known, several prominent members of the Wiener Kreis 
took a syntactic or logical approach to the matter. If, the logical positivists 
apparently reasoned, epistemology and methodology are incapable of distin-
guishing the scientific from the non-scientific, then perhaps the theory of 
meaning will do the job. A statement, they suggested, was scientific just in 
case it had a determinate meaning; and meaningful statements were those 
which could be exhaustively verified. As Popper once observed, the posi-
tivists thought that "verifiability, meaningfulness, and scientific character all 
coincide." 11 
Despite its many reformulations during the late 1920's and 1930's verifica-
tionism enjoyed mixed fortunes as a theory of meaning. 12 But as a would-be 
demarcation between the scientific and the non-scientific, it was a disaster. 
Not only are many statements in the sciences not open to exhaustive verifica-
tion (e.g., all universal laws), but the vast majority of non-scientific and 
pseudo-scientific systems of belief have verifiable constituents. Consider, for 
instance, the thesis that the Earth is flat. To subscribe to such a belief in the 
twentieth century would be the height of folly. Yet such a statement is 
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verifiable in the sense that we can specify a class of possible observations 
which would verify it. Indeed, every belief which has ever been rejected as 
a part of science because it was 'falsified' is (at least partially) verifiable. 
Because verifiable, it is thus (according to the 'mature positivists" criterion) 
both meaningful and scientific. 
A second familiar approach from the same period is Karl Popper's 'falsi-
ficationist' criterion, which fares no better. Apart from the fact that it 
leaves ambiguous the scientific status of virtually every singular existential 
statement, however well supported (e.g., the claim that there are atoms, that 
there is a planet closer to the sun than the Earth, that there is a missing link), 
it has the untoward consequence of countenancing as 'scientific' every crank 
claim which makes ascertain ably false assertions. Thus flat Earthers, biblical 
creationists, proponents of laetrile or orgone boxes, Uri Geller devotees, 
Bermuda Triangulators, circle squarers, Lysenkoists, charioteers of the 
gods, perpetuum mobile builders, Big Foot searchers, Loch Nessians, faith 
healers, polywater dabblers, Rosicrucians, the-world-is-about-to-enders, 
primal screamers, water diviners, magicians, and astrologers all turn out to 
be scientific on Popper's criterion - just so long as they are prepared to 
indicate some observation, however improbable, which (if it came to pass) 
would cause them to change their minds. 
One might respond to such criticisms by saying that scientific status is a 
matter of degree rather than kind. Sciences such as physics and chemistry 
have a high degree of testability, it might be said, while the systems we regard 
as pseudo-scientific are far less open to empirical scrutiny. Acute technical 
difficulties confront this suggestion, for the only articulated theory of degrees 
of testability (Popper's) makes it impossible to compare the degrees of 
testability of two distinct theories except when one entails the other. Since 
(one hopes!) no 'scientific' theory entails any 'pseudo-scientific' one, the 
relevant comparisons cannot be made. But even if this problem could be 
overcome, and if it were possible for us to conclude (say) that the general 
theory of relativity was more testable (and thus by definition more scientific) 
than astrology, it would not follow that astrology was any less worthy of 
belief than relativity - for testability is a semantic rather than an episternic 
notion, which entails nothing whatever about belief-worthiness. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to ponder the importance of this differ-
ence. I said before that the shift from the older to the newer demarcationist 
orientation could be described as a move from epistemic to syntactic and 
semantic strategies. In fact, the shift is even more significant than that way of 
describing the transition suggests. The central concern of the older tradition 
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had been to identify those ideas or theories which were worthy of belief. 
To judge a statement to be scientific was to make a retrospective judgment 
about how that statement had stood up to empirical scrutiny. With the 
positivists and Popper, however, this retrospective element drops out al-
together. Scientific status, on their analysis, is not a matter of evidential 
support or belief-worthiness, for all sorts of ill-founded claims are testable 
and thus scientific on the new view. 
The failure of the newer demarcationist tradition to insist on the necessity 
of retrospective evidential assessments for determining scientific status goes 
some considerable way to undermining the practical utility of the demarca-
tionist enterprise, precisely because most of the 'cranky' beliefs about which 
one might incline to be dismissive turn out to be 'scientific' according to 
falsificationist or (partial) verificationist criteria. The older demarcationist 
tradition, concerned with actual epistemic warrant rather than potential 
epistemic scrutability, would never have countenanced such an undemanding 
sense of the 'scientific'. More to the point, the new tradition has had to pay 
a hefty price for its scaled-down expectations. Unwilling to link scientific 
status to any evidential warrant, twentieth century demarcationists have been 
forced into characterizing the ideologies they oppose (whether Marxism, 
psychoanalysis or creationism) as untestable in principle. Very occasionally, 
that label is appropriate. But more often than not," the views in question can 
be tested, have been tested, and have failed those tests. But such failures 
cannot impugn their (new) scientific status: quite the reverse, by virtue of 
failing the epistemic tests to which they are subjected, these views guarantee 
that they satisfy the relevant semantic criteria for scientific status! The new 
demarcationism thus reveals itself as a largely toothless wonder, which serves 
neither to explicate the paradigmatic usages of 'scientific' (and its cognates) 
nor to perform the critical stable-cleaning chores for which it was originally 
intended. 
For these, and a host of other reasons familiar in the philosophical litera-
ture, neither verificationism nor falsificationism offers much promise of 
drawing a useful distinction between the scientific and the non-scientific. 
Are there other plausible candidates for explicating the distinction? 
Several seem to be waiting in the wings. One might suggest, for instance, 
that scientific claims are well tested, whereas non-scientific ones are not. 
Alternatively (an approach taken by Thagard),13 one might maintain that 
scientific knowledge is unique in exhibiting progress or growth. Some have 
suggested that scientific theories alone make surprising predictions which turn 
out to be true. One might even go in the pragmatic direction and maintain 
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that science is the sole repository of useful and reliable knowledge. Or, 
fmally, one might propose that science is the only form of intellectual system-
building which proceeds cumulatively, with later views embracing earlier 
ones, or at least retaining those earlier views as limiting cases.14 
It can readily be shown that none of these suggestions can be a necessary 
and sufficient condition for something to count as 'science', at least not as 
that term is customarily used. And in most cases, these are not even plausible 
as necessary conditions. Let me sketch out some of the reasons why these 
proposals are so unpromising. Take the requirement of well-testedness. 
Unfortunately, we have no viable over-arching account of the circumstances 
under which a claim may be regarded as well tested. But even if we did, is it 
plausible to suggest that all the assertions in science texts (let alone science 
journals) have been well tested and that none of the assertions in such conven-
tionally non-scientific fields as literary theory, carpentry or football strategy 
are well tested? When a scientist presents a conjecture which has not yet been 
tested and is such that we are not yet sure what would count as a robust test 
of it, has that scientist ceased doing science when he discusses his conjecture? 
On the other side of the divide, is anyone prepared to say that we have no 
convincing evidence for such 'non-scientific' claims as that "Bacon did not 
write the plays attributed to Shakespeare", that "a mitre joint is stronger 
than a flush joint", or that "off-side kicks are not usually fumbled"? Indeed, 
are we not entitled to say that all these claims are much better supported by 
the evidence than many of the 'scientific' assumptions of (say) cosmology 
or psychology? 
The reason for this divergence is simple to see. Many, perhaps most, 
parts of science are highly speculative compared with many non-scientific 
disciplines. There seems good reason, given from the historical record, to 
suppose that most scientific theories are false; under the circumstances, 
how plausible can be the claim that science is the repository of all and only 
reliable or well-confirmed theories? 
Similarly, cognitive progress is not unique to the 'sciences'. Many disci-
plines (e.g., literary criticism, military strategy, and perhaps even philosophy) 
can claim to know more about their respective domains than they did 50 or 
100 years ago. By contrast, we can point to several 'sciences' which, during 
certain periods of their history, exhibited little or no progress. iS Continuous, 
or even sporadic, cognitive growth seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the activities we regard as scientific. Finally, consider the 
requirement of cumulative theory transitions as a demarcation criterion. As 
several a\lthors 16 have shown, this will not do even as a necessary condition 
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for marking off scientific knowledge, since many scientific theories - even 
those in the so-called 'mature sciences' - do not contain their predecessors, 
not even as limiting cases. 
I will not pretend to be able to prove that there is no conceivable philo-
sophical reconstruction of our intuitive distinction between the scientific and 
the non-scientific. I do believe, though, that we are warranted in saying that 
none of the criteria which have been offered thus far promises to explicate 
the distinction. 
But we can go further than this, for we have learned enough about what 
passes for science in our culture to be able to say quite confidently that it is 
not all cut from the same epistemic cloth. Some scientific theories are well 
tested; some are not. Some branches of science are presently showing high 
rates of growth; others are not. Some scientific theories have made a host of 
successful predictions of surprising phenomena; some have made few if any 
such predictions. Some scientific hypotheses are ad hoc; others are not. Some 
have achieved a 'consilience of inductions'; others have not. (Similar remarks 
could be made about several non-scientific theories and disciplines.) The 
evident epistemic heterogeneity of the activities and beliefs customarily 
regarded as scientific should alert us to the probable futility of seeking an 
epistemic version of a demarcation criterion. Where, even after detailed 
analysis, there appear to be no epistemic invariants, one is well advised not 
to take their existence for granted. But to say as much is in effect to say that 
the problem of demarcation - the very problem which Popper labelled 'the 
central problem of epistemology' - is spurious, for that problem presupposes 
the existence of just such invariants. 
In asserting that the problem of demarcation between science and non-
science is a pseUdo-problem (at least as far as philosophy is concerned), I am 
manifestly not denying that there are crucial epistemic and methodological 
questions to be raised about knowledge claims, whether we classify them as 
scientific or not. Nor, to belabor the obvious, am I saying that we are never 
entitled to argue that a certain piece of science is epistemically warranted and 
that a certain piece of pseudo-science is not. It remains as important as it ever 
was to ask questions like: When is a claim well confirmed? When can we 
regard a theory as well tested? What characterizes cognitive progress? But 
once we have answers to such questions (and we are still a long way from that 
happy state!), there will be little left to inquire into which is epistemically 
significant. 
One final point needs to be stressed. In arguing that it remains important 
to retain a distinction between reliable and unreliable knowledge, I am not 
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trying to resurrect the science Jnon -science demarcation under a new guise. 17 
However we eventually settle the question of reliable knowledge, the class 
of statements falling under that rubric will include much that is not com-
monly regarded as 'scientific' and it will exclude much that is generally 
considered 'scientific'. This, too, follows from the episternic heterogeneity of 
the sciences. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Through certain vagaries of history, some of which I have alluded to here, we 
have managed to conflate two quite distinct questions: What makes a belief 
well founded (or heuristically fertile)? And what makes a belief scientific? 
The first set of questions is philosophically interesting and possibly even 
tractable; the second question is both uninteresting and, judging by its 
checkered past, intractable. If we would stand up and be counted on the 
side of reason, we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscientific' 
from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive 
work for us. As such, they are more suited to the rhetoric of politicians and 
Scottish sociologists of knowledge than to that of empirical researchers. is 
Insofar as our concern is to protect ourselves and our fellows from the 
cardinal sin of believing what we wish were so rather than what there is 
substantial evidence for (and surely that is what most forms of 'quackery' 
come down to), then our focus should be squarely on the empirical and 
conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The 'scientific' status 
of those claims is altogether irrelevant. 
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